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other difficulties. But are we absolved from concern about religion just because it is a difficult subject? It would indeed be a damning verdict if it should be established that educated men abandon religion primarily because there are serious difficulties to be met. But such a verdict is most unlikely. Quietly but persistently college men everywhere are responding to the call for volunteers

in the pressing work of theological reconstruction and in the practical adaptation of religion to our modern social needs. The time has come when the scientific spirit and the religious quest can walk hand in hand. The result may mean significant changes in our ways of thinking and acting; but it will mean new vigor and wider influence for the cause of religion.

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## THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEBREW WISDOM

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Seven words suffice. St. Paul to describe the respective attitudes of the two great originative minds of the ages toward the problem of life. "Jews," he says, "demand signs, and Greeks seek wisdom." With the temperaments of both races he was thoroughly familiar; and his luminous discrimination, as Bishop Lightfoot says, "hits them off to perfection." It is to be noted, however, that he is describing a process, not a result. Neither racial cast of mind, as he goes on to intimate, fully solves the problem on its lines alone; the solution comes by a way which, though condemned by both, eventually blends their ideals of attaining their quest in one simple and concrete finality.

From very early in their history the Hebrew people were endeavoring to discover and utilize the wisdom and power of the universe, that is, to see things as they are and adjust life to them. Nor

have we any reason to think the same was less true of that far more intellectual race, the Greek. But the two started from opposite poles. In the Greek system God was the final term; a term therefore always sought, approximated nearer and nearer, and never fully found, as is typified in that mathematical figure the asymptote, wherein one line always approaches another but never meets it. The initial term was the human mind projected toward infinity; and as long as the mind grew the final goal receded. In the Hebrew system, if system it may be called, God was the initial term, a fixed postulate, never questioned, never in abeyance; and the final term, the perfection of manhood, was similarly a receding goal, until the way of it was assured by the removal of the stumbling-block and the acceptance of the supreme sign, the cross of Christ.

The two attitudes were similarly

typified in the names chosen for the operation. With the Hebrews it was wisdom, as if, so far as they had gone, the solution were already beyond question. With the Greeks the assumption was never made that their process had reached its goal; it was philosophy, the *love* of wisdom, a love always in quest of its object and enjoying the process of search.

In still simpler terms, perhaps, we may describe the two attitudes by saying, the Greeks were concerned in building a philosophy of life, the Hebrews in setting at work a philosophy already presupposed. It was like the difference between pure and applied science; between music absolute and music set to a form of words. Neither procedure was complete without the other; and both together were not proved and final without the supplementation afforded by the third element of adult and self-sufficing personality, in which, beyond the gropings of theory,

. . . . the Word had breath, and wrought  
With human hands the creed of creeds,  
In loveliness of perfect deeds,  
More strong than all poetic thought.

It was wisdom translated into that perfect pragmatism in which the truth of an idea was determined by its fruits for life.

# I

Until the end of the reign of David the Hebrews in a very naïve temper interpreted experience in terms of pure supernaturalism. The one cause of things was a personal Will exercised from without and above, arbitrary it might be, but absolute in its demands, and brooking no evasion or accommodation on man's part. As Balaam found

by prophetic augury, and as Samuel told the headstrong Saul, "God, the strength of Israel, is not a man that he should lie, neither the son of man, that he should repent" (Num. 23:19; I Sam. 15:29). Before such a will the nation had little initiative, except to watch its working and infer its purpose, as manifested in factual events. At the Red Sea Jehovah was apprehended as a man of war fighting for them; at Sinai as a party to a compact; at the ancient river Kishon as one who had come up from his residence in the desert to deliver them from the Canaanites. They had nothing to do but obey; the wisdom in which they wrought was conceived as dictated to them from without. The first term of their philosophy was all in all; the sense of human initiative not yet awake and aware of itself. Their security lay in a blind unquestioning obedience; their dissent not in reasoned judgment but in an equally blind rebellion.

This passive state of mind, however, was never absolute. In fact, by all God's dealings with them they were being educated out of it. They were discovering little by little that the cause of things, their woes or their successes, was in themselves. They were getting a sense not merely of an arbitrary Will above them but of rational and active cause and effect within their own nature. This is suggestively indicated in the earliest quoted folk's maxim that is preserved to us, David's remark to Saul, "Out of the wicked cometh forth wickedness" (I Sam. 24:13), as much as to say, Wickedness is not an unmotivated or casual thing, as it were some chance or hapless infraction, but the accurate expression of a personal bent and nature,

not a freak of conduct but the fruit of a tree. Proverbs become worn to truisms; but in the beginning they give expression to a discovery and a kind of lively surprise. It is interesting to note therefore how long before David was a young man (for he calls it "the proverb of the ancients") the folk's mind was leaving the quietism or fatalism which refers everything to the supernatural and by the principle of cause and effect taking responsibility for their own character. The germ of the whole body of Wisdom utterance lies capsule in this.

If the reign of Solomon did not witness an immense uprise of the wisdom consciousness among all classes of the people, then all we can say is, it did not bear its natural fruit. That was its distinctive contribution to the nation's *Weltanschauung*. It is the bent of the Hebrew mind to demand signs; the nation had long been schooled, in their long struggle for independence, to note the signs of Jehovah's favor or frown; and now all at once the reassuring signs were far exceeding the demand. All around them the people saw the tokens: stately public buildings and public works going up; armies of busy laborers, in which for a time they were content to be numbered even under a *corvée*; caravans arriving every day with costly luxuries from far-off lands; visits from foreign potentates and world-famed monarchs; news of alliances and commercial enterprises; splendid evidences that they were counted a nation among the nations of the earth, and admitted to equal terms with them. The enthusiastic record in I Kings reflects the almost childish wonder with which all these things were contemplated. These were

signs of a new and enlarged order of things; but not necessarily miraculous signs. They were effects which on the face of them revealed palpable causes working in the natural course of events. There was their sagacious versatile young king making his wisdom the ruling factor in affairs, and piling up wealth and fame and worldly achievement for his kingdom.

Nor was the impulse lacking to put the secret of this new order of things into literary and philosophical expression. It began apparently as a kind of fad and court euphuism, in which the elegant young scholars and courtiers of the palace, with the king at their head, exercised their wits together. But this fact gave the wisdom utterance at once an immense *éclat* and zest; no launching of a new style of literature could well be more auspicious. And this luxuriant activity of wisdom utterance seems to have been the first Hebrew instance of the cultivation of literature for its own sake. Its formal basis, the *mashal*, was called in from its currency as folk maxims and subjected to refined and artistic development. So the proverb and parable were speedily molded into the accepted vehicle of a philosophy of life and an instrument of popular education.

The Hebrew reasons not by premise and conclusion, not by a chain of argumentation, but by picture and analogy. He does not arrive speculatively at the truth; he sees it rounded and finished before him. He demands a sign, and the analogy, the likeness or contrast, is the sign. Hence a main characteristic of his utterance is its absoluteness. He does not infer or conjecture; he affirms.

There are no points of uncertainty while the premise is waiting for its conclusion; no intermediate steps; the statement is dogmatic and oracular. It may be a half-truth; not infrequently is; but there is no opening left for the shading of the other half. As far as it goes it is absolute. This of course does much to determine the field and range of his utterance. His wisdom moves among truths that are susceptible to such absoluteness of statement; it is wisdom, not philosophy.

In a sense this manner of statement may be regarded not as a contrast to, but a vigorous condensation of, the typical line of reasoning; something like the enthymeme as distinguished from the full syllogism. The conclusion is affirmed with uttermost emphasis; the process by which it is arrived at is left out. Between the analogy or sign which furnished the occasion and the full-orbed truth affirmed there is a gap for the reader or hearer to fill in; and so the latter is compelled to furnish the contribution of his own thought to the solution. In this gap for the reader or hearer lies in great part the zest of the *mashal*; it is what made the proverb so favorite a form of utterance.

The word *mashal*, mostly translated "proverb," is a generic term with a large latitude of meaning; it does not differentiate, as we do, between proverb, parable, fable, allegory; nor between prose and verse; nor between the sententious or *style coupé* of the Solomonic maxim and the flowing and continuous, or *style soutenu* of the later Wisdom. All are alike *mashals* embodying in some fitting form the primary meaning of likeness, or analogy. The differentia-

tion, so far as it is made specific, is not of form but of function. In Prov. 1:6 two main functions are specified, which, however, may be united, and perhaps generally are in the same *mashal*. Four things are indeed mentioned there; but I regard the first and third as generic, and the second and fourth as the differentiating terms. The verse runs:

To understand a *mashal* and an interpretation, [אִמְלִיצָה, *am'liṣā*]; Words of the wise, and their dark sayings, [מִדְּבָרֵי חֵכְמָה, *miḏḏəbārē hēkhām*].

Here the two functions are, so to say, to shed light and to shed darkness; the *מִלְּיָצָה*, an interpretation, and the *מִדְּבָרֵי*, a dark saying or riddle. Professor Toy's translation of the latter term by aphorism is felicitous, but does not seem to me to connote quite clearly enough the element of darkness or riddle that inheres in the word. In fact, as the Hebrews chose the *mashal* as the first form to be developed into self-conscious literary utterance, they seemed to recognize in literature as literature a certain indirection; as if to have literary zest and charm an expression which would otherwise be bald or statistical, like a cuneiform inscription, must be enriched by an overtone of figure or some thought-compelling turn by which the hint of a second idea would play around the fundamental one. We have much the same feeling today about literature as distinguished from thought expressed in formulae or severe scientific literalness. Literary utterance is charged more or less with overtones, harmonics, which in an appreciative reader rouses an emotion of delight and a sense of enriched or involved idea. You do not get at the

truth directly but as it were by conductors. The Hebrews saw the possibilities of the *mashal* for this literary purpose; accordingly they devised its artistic function as both *mēlîṣā* (מְלִיצָה) and *hîdhā* (הִידָה), containing at once clearness and involvement.

This double idea of the function of the *mashal* connects itself quite intimately with Wisdom's endeavor to co-ordinate causes and effects in the sphere of industry, social intercourse, morals, speech and silence, and the numerous other interests of daily experience. There was a kind of surprise, a tang of puzzlement, in noting causes and effects that were in a degree remote; it was a phase of leaving out intermediate steps of induction, as already spoken of. In a great many proverbs there is that hiatus of remoteness to be traversed in order to get at the real truth of life. Treasures, for instance, are a palpable token of enrichment, you may think; not so: treasures of wickedness profit nothing. Righteousness, rather than cleverness, you may deem of no avail in a perilous pinch; you are wrong: righteousness delivereth from death. How; by what steps of connection? Well, think it out for yourself; it is so.

## II

The Book of Proverbs is an anthology of Wisdom utterances, a deposit of *mashals* of a certain artistic species and finish, gathered from various sources, and representing the accumulation of a long period of time. This character of the book lies on the face of it. To say they are the proverbs of Solomon is not to imply he wrote, or dictated, or even personally inspired them; it names a

*genre* rather than an authorship; as we should say Solomonic proverbs, connoting therewith partly the form or mold of expression, partly the period or personal influence from which it came. There are other *mashals*, older and younger, which are not in the Solomonic *genre*: the *mashals* of Balaam; the *mashals* of the Book of Job; the *mashals* of Koheleth; the *mashals* of Jesus Sirach; the parables of our Lord. All answer to the literary sense and artistry of their time; and all, so far as they are a self-conscious and not run-wild form of utterance, seem to combine in various proportions the elements of *mēlîṣā* (מְלִיצָה) and *hîdhā* (הִידָה); as even our Lord averred that he adopted the parable in order that men might see and yet not see.

As a series of *mashal* deposits or collections, the Book of Proverbs represents, to my mind, the didactic and educational pabulum furnished the Hebrew people between the time of Solomon and the time of Hezekiah. It was what the rank and file of the people, and especially the young, had available for guidance and instruction before the Book of the Law was found in the temple, and while historic traditions of the past were circulating mainly as folk-tales, or perhaps, as in the case of the J and E stories, as basis for catechetical instruction. The people of that period would have fared rather leanly for literary pabulum if it had not been for these precepts of their local sages and schoolmasters; as it was, however, they were well grounded in that natural religion combined with sagacious insight which the later prophets and men of letters could take for granted and appeal

to as a popular fund of ideas. With these proverbs in mind and memory, wisdom as it were in tabloid form, they were becoming what their later contact with other nations proved them to be, the best educated common folk of antiquity.

Beginning with the tenth chapter, where the distinctive Solomonic proverbs begin, I regard the successive deposits of which the marks are traceable as mainly chronological; though also local schools and sages may have had some share in determining the complexion, so to say, of the mashal. From 10:1 to 22:16 the mashal is Solomonic in its severest and most classic form: all the proverbs being couplets and aiming at the most clean-cut and sententious expression. This seems to be the directest reflection of the vigorous mashal type evolved in the Solomonic court. Inside this section, however, may be traced a cleavage indicating perhaps different stages in the exposition of truth. Chaps. 10 to 15 show a great predominance of the antithetic couplet, wherein by a single absolute assertion great elemental things, righteousness and wickedness, wisdom and folly, docility and perverseness, industry and sloth, silly speech and wise silence, are set squarely over against each other, each elucidated merely by its contrast. It is like the fundamental grounding for life and especially youthful life, to observe at its spiritual peril. Now the antithetic method, as we know, defines and concentrates, strikes as it were for the core of thought, but does not enrich it; it stands there in its bald absoluteness, tolerating no shading or gainsaying. Such defining of terms seems to reflect the initial impulse of the didactic instinct. In the rest of the section,

16:1 to 22:16, there is an equal predominance of the synonymous and synthetic couplet, connoting a somewhat more developed and articulated line of thinking. A single statement of a truth is felt to be inadequate; it must be repeated in varied form; it must grow in the repetition, and thereby do something to defend itself from error or gainsaying. Along with this the quality of the subject-matter varies, showing a tendency to leave the unhewn contrasts of life and go farther afield, to thoughts that, having more the element of discovery, require more the element of interpretation. With the predominance of the synthetic and synonymous couplet the door was soon open for relieving the rigidity of the couplet type of mashal. An antithesis is a self-closing circuit; not so a synonym or epexegetis. If one line may be added to enrich the thought, there is no reason why more should not be added as long as the articulation of the thought requires it; and so the mashal, from being a self-closed circuit, tends to become continuous. Accordingly we find in the next section, 22:17 to 24:22, which a short preface commends not as Solomon's but as "words of the wise," a prevalence and predominance of the quatrain, and one long continuous mashal, 23:29-35, on the evils of wine-bibbing. A short appendix to this section, 24:23-34, "also . . . of the wise," is of longer mashals: one of five lines; one of two; one of three; one quatrain; ending with a mashal of eleven lines, vss. 30-34, on the sluggard; which last seems to be a stanza with a refrain, its fellow-stanza being supplied in the introductory section of the book, 6:6-11.

In the Hezekian section, chaps. 25 to 29, which professes to be a Solomonic compilation, there is a return to the couplet; though in the middle is one long mashal, 27:23-27, on husbandry and the care of flocks. In this section there is a predominance of simile and metaphor; there are only a few similes, in fact, outside of this Hezekian section. The finished simile, as compared with antithesis and epexegetis, seems to connote a more subtle artistic sense, and perhaps a more remote relation of cause and effect; for a simile, essentially, calls attention not to the wholesale and obvious likeness of things but to the one surprising point of resemblance in things essentially unlike. The thought of this section corresponds with the artistic advance; it deals with things decidedly more far-fetched and remote from the common. As indicated in the heading of the section, Wisdom is by this time in the hands of matured and as it were accredited men of letters.

The Agur section, chap. 30, consists mostly of longer mashals; and here a new form appears, the numerical mashal, a form so highly artificial, so laboriously mindful of form for form's sake, that the thought value suffers, being not always up to standard. Only one other numerical mashal, outside this Agur section, occurs in the Book of Proverbs; namely in 6:16-19, which seems to me decidedly more elemental and weighty than Agur's work. In the latter, in fact, we detect an approach to the comparative thinness and—well, let us say, puttering—that one sees in collections like the *Pirke Aboth*. This, however, may be rather a personal idiosyncrasy than a general sign of decadence; for in

the praise of the Worthy Woman, 31:10-31, which ends the Book of Proverbs, the poem, though in the highly artificial form of the acrostic, is of exquisite thought-value and unlabored spontaneity. Nor do the other acrostics of Scripture suffer materially from this form; Psalm 119, the most ambitious of them, bears most clearly the marks of the workman's labor.

### III

Underneath the artistry of the mashal we have noted a rhetorical development, a ripening and refining of the form, corresponding to a venturesomeness into more exigent spheres of exposition. Along with this spontaneous adaptation of thought to form went also an increasing self-confidence and assurance of discovery. The sages felt not only that they were advancing into more intricate and surprising interrelations of cause and effect but that these were more clearly valid guides to the absolute truth of things. This was due in some degree to the reflex influence of their literary art, but mainly to the rising conviction that the reverent findings of the human mind were to be trusted as a discovery of the mind of God. Their wisdom was an intellectual product; it began consciously, not with the ungainsayable. Thus saith the Lord, as did prophecy, but with Thus is the verdict of the clear-seeing sagacious man, the man who holds his heart not perverse but open-minded and constructive, on the problems of being. And as their study went on it was increasingly felt that this verdict had a quasi-revelatory value; it could be trusted, as truly as the prophet's word, to speak authoritatively the mind

of God. Here, I think, we are to note a movement of the Hebrew consciousness. It is cutting loose from the tether of pure supernaturalism, and exploring the secrets of second cause and natural law. The Jews demand a sign, it is true; but these schoolmasters of the people were finding the signs in human and natural phenomena, not alone in miracle. Yet they had no quarrel with miracle either; for God was their initial term, and from the beginning their human mind maintained its partnership with the divine.

It is the tendency of any philosophy or science to develop a terminology; certain words or phrases distinctive of that line of thought, which after their coinage or adoption may stand without need of exposition as a kind of shorthand record of discovery. For illustration of this fact I need only refer to such biological terms as "struggle for existence," "natural selection," "survival of the fittest" which advertise themselves as technicalisms of the theory of evolution. I think I may point to such a *terminus technicus* of the Hebrew Wisdom, which for a time played a prominent part in the philosophical vocabulary, and then seems to have disappeared, or to have become absorbed as a recognized matter of course. It is the word *tūshṭyyā* (תוֹשֶׁטְיָא). If, as I have been led to think, it means (nearly) "intuition" or "insight,"<sup>1</sup> it is a very suggestive indication of the distinctive value they had come to set upon their reasoning powers. I have touched on this before: it is what distinguishes the Hebrew mind from the Greek. The Greeks reason tentatively from premise to conclusion, and their conclusion must

needs remain as uncertain, as subject to doubt, as their premise. The Hebrews, on the other hand, reason by analogy; seeing a truth, as it were, standing out pictured before them, in likeness or contrast to something else. Hence they make no tentative lines of approach; they see the truth intuitively. Hence comes what I have already mentioned, their absoluteness of affirmation; hence also the fact that they confine their philosophy, or wisdom, to things susceptible to that intuitional treatment. The term *thushiya*, as it seems to me, is a monument to their discovery that intuition, the native insight of the human mind, was a thing whose findings were to be trusted without waiting for an authoritative word from heaven.

The earliest occurrence of the word *thushiya* is in Prov. 18:1, in the older Solomonic section of the book. The *mashal* is really one of penetrative implication, and by no means a truism: "He that separateth himself seeketh his own desire [or as we should say, is self-centered, egoistic], and quarreleth with all *tushiya*." One cannot determine whether this early use of the word has the flavor of a technicalism or not. It seems quite decidedly to have, however, in the introductory section of Proverbs, where it occurs three times, and still more in the Book of Job, where it occurs five times. The use of the word by Isaiah and Micah (once by each prophet) seems to furnish a pointer to the age when the wisdom strain of utterance was in the most popular and almost exclusive vogue. Isaiah, in 28:23-29, composes a passage in the wisdom idiom,

<sup>1</sup> See my article on "Meaning and Usage of the Term תוֹשֶׁטְיָא" in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, read to the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis in December, 1910.

apparently because such presentation of truth is surest to gain a hearing, and in order to show the audience that Jehovah, as well as they, is excellent in *thushiya* and Micah, in a similar way, lapses into the popular talk of markets and crops, in order apparently to show how *thushiya* ought to have the insight to see Jehovah's name in the reasonable things of religion as truly as when the voice of Jehovah cries to the city. Thus he seems to recognize much the same situation as does his contemporary prophet: that Israel is becoming so keen to see worldly and, so to say, finical relations as to ignore the weightier matters which bear the stamp of the divine.

The conventional way in which, in 28:23, Isaiah calls attention to his *mashal* passage reminds one of the section of Proverbs beginning at 22:17, which is similarly introduced, and also of the numerous employments of such a formula in the introductory section of Prov., chaps. 1 to 9. The conventional call to incline the ear and listen had become the "note" of the sage and his wisdom findings, like the "Thus saith the Lord" of the prophet, and the "And the Lord spake unto Moses" of the legalist. I am inclined to think, therefore, that Isaiah furnishes a pointer to the approximate age of the Proverb compilation. The anthology, substantially as we have it up to chap. 29, may, I think have been compiled in the time of Isaiah, perhaps not long after the men of Hezekiah were copying out the aftermath of the Solomonic *mashals*. The evident popular vogue of this species of literature, against which even prophecy could with difficulty obtain a hearing, would seem to make this a natural and

fitting time for it. By that time the unquestioned wisdom values would be in hand, ready to be published as paternal counsels and eulogized under the personification of Our Lady Wisdom; not yet, however were they showing signs of hardening into an intolerant orthodoxy, as we see in the words of Job's friends; and still less were they ripe for the reaction which later Satan launched against the too fatally easy motive of the current wisdom, in the Book of Job.

The sage's sense of the penetrative value of *תושייה*, as a guide toward the secrets of being, is suggestively indicated in several passages of the Book of Job; in Eliphaz' remark to Job, 5:12, that the hands of the crafty (or perhaps we may say, men of wire-drawn cavils, such as he insinuates Job to be) cannot accomplish *tushiyya* (*תושייה*); in Job's complaint, 6:13, that his benumbing affliction has driven *tushiyya* (*תושייה*) away from him; in Job's ironical remark to Zophar, 26:3, "How hast thou made known *tushiyya* (*תושייה*) in exuberance"; and especially in Zophar's remark as he is describing the secrets of God, 11:6, that there is fold on fold (double-fold) *kāph'āyīm* (*כפלים*) to *tushiyya* (*תושייה*). Evidently it was a much-valued faculty, whose potencies for the discovery of truth the sages were not disposed to limit. If this was so, we can see how the sense of its absolute verity should grow until by the time of Agur, even as preface to an agnostic pronouncement, the formula *n'ām* *Yāhwé* (*נאם יהוה*), which had been the exclusive property of the prophets, could with a note of audacity be replaced by the phrase *n'ām hāggēbhēr* (*נאם*

הָאִשָּׁר), "oracle of the man." The revelatory value of wisdom, it would seem, came in men's minds to stand side by side with the prophetic word from the unseen. Supernaturalism was still a cherished channel of truth; but an intuitionist philosophy had been developed to match it, and perhaps pass the judgment of human reason upon it.

For the truths of its own chosen field, truths of life and livelihood on this earth, the wisdom which had come to set so high an estimate on human insight could still retain much of its absoluteness of tone and be cherished as the seasoned lore of scribes and scholars; though even here, as we see in Koheleth, there came upon men a sense of bafflement and of the essential vanity of it all. As for the speculations that impinge on the unseen, with the subsidence of prophecy there supervened a blank agnosticism all along the line. The poets so avid of a sign were saying (Ps. 124:9), "We see not our signs; there is no more any prophet; neither is there among us any that knoweth how long," and the inquiries which had concerned themselves with coming concrete events were passing into apocalyptic, postponing its manifestation of the supernatural to a shadowy

remoteness of the future. Agur, complaining with characteristic Hebrew hyperbole of being more brutish than a man, was inquiring doubtfully of God, "What is his name, and what is his son's name, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4). Koheleth, bewildered with the question "Who shall bring man to see what shall be after him?" (Eccles. 6:12) gives up also the hope of penetrating the secrets of being: "Far off, that which is, and deep, deep—who shall find it?" (Eccles. 7:24). Wisdom too, with all its pristine confidence, reaches a time when its spokesmen are

Wandering between two worlds, one dead,  
The other powerless to be born.

But it is only the confession of ignorance which is the healthy prelude to a new access of wisdom; the diagnosing of the disease in preparation for the remedy. In due time a strange new sign appears for the sign-seekers, a seeming ultimatum of folly for the philosophers to resolve; and to those who penetrate the enigma and commit their faith to it there stands forth, for the world to see and number its years by, a Personality who proves, no more by speculation but by deep reality, the wisdom of God and the power of God.